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11	UNITED STATE	S DISTRICT COURT
12	CENTRAL DISTR	RICT OF CALIFORNIA
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	FAIR EDUCATION SANTA BARBARA, Inc., a 501(c)(3) organization Plaintiff, v. SANTA BARBARA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, a public school district; and JUST COMMUNITIES CENTRAL COAST, INC., a 501(c)(3) organization Defendants.	 CASE NO. 2:18-cv-10253-SVW-PLA DEFENDANT JUST COMMUNITIES CENTRAL COAST, INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS I-IV, AND VI OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT The Honorable Stephen V. Wilson Date: February 25, 2019 Time: 1:30 pm Courtroom: 10A
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28	Just Communities Central Coast, Inc.'s Motion To Dismiss	Case No. 2:18-cv-10253-SVW-PLA

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NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on February 25, 2019 at 1:30 p.m., in Courtroom
10A, 10th Floor, United States District Court for the Central District of California, First
Street Courthouse, 350 West 1st Street, Los Angeles, California, 90012, Defendant Just
Communities Central Coast, Inc. ("JCCC") will and hereby does move for an order
dismissing Counts I-IV and VI in Plaintiff Fair Education Santa Barbara, Inc. ("FESB")'s
Complaint.

In particular, JCCC moves to dismiss FESB's claims under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d *et seq.* (Count I), the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, via 41 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count
II), and Cal. Gov. Code § 11135 (Count III) for failing to plead sufficient facts
demonstrating standing; Cal. Educ. Code § 220 (Count IV) for failure to state a claim under
that section's heightened pleading standard; and Cal. Pub. Con. Code § 20111 (Count VI)
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

This motion is supported by the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed concurrently herewith, all pleadings and papers on file or to be filed in the aboveentitled action, argument of counsel, and any other matters that may properly come before the Court for its consideration.

Pursuant to L.R. 7-3, counsel for JCCC reached out to FESB's counsel to facilitate
a conversation concerning JCCC's Motion. Counsel for all parties spoke by telephone on
January 7, 2019, but were not able to reach a resolution that obviated this motion. The
parties agreed to a hearing date of February 25, 2019 to allow FESB additional time to
consider JCCC's arguments in this motion and ensure all counsel could participate in the
hearing.

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff FESB's wide-ranging Complaint suffers multiple fundamental pleading 3 defects that warrant dismissal of each of the five¹ claims against JCCC. FESB's sprawling 4 5 allegations run the gamut from federal discrimination claims to an alleged violation of California public-contract bidding requirements; on that last claim, FESB also filed a 6 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. But each of FESB's claims is insufficient, as a matter 7 of law, and must be dismissed. In particular, FESB does not have individual or 8 9 organizational standing to bring the federal and state-analogue discrimination claims, and the California Education Code § 220 claim does not meet the pleading standard. Moreover, 10 as also discussed in JCCC's Opposition to FESB's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, this 11 Court does not have jurisdiction over FESB's state law claim related to the formation of 12 the contract between JCCC and the Santa Barbara Unified School District ("SBUSD"). 13 For these reasons, and as discussed more fully herein, FESB's claims against JCCC should 14 be dismissed. 15

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II. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

JCCC is an organization that prioritizes the development of culturally proficient and 17 equitable school communities, seeking to "bring together community members and 18 empower them to be leaders who promote equity around issues of race, socioeconomic 19 class, sexual orientation, [and] gender." Dkt. No. 1-1 (2018 Proposed Contract between 20 JCCC and SBUSD) at 2; Dkt. No. 1 (Complaint) at 5. JCCC offers a number of services 21 to school communities, such as SBUSD, including training and educational programs that 22 foster diversity, inclusion, and equity, as well as school-specific coaching and consultation. 23 Dkt. No. 1 at 5. JCCC "work[s] to ensure that Central Coast schools, organizations and 24 communities are places of opportunity, not places of limitations." Id. JCCC's trainings 25

FESB asserts Count V (alleged violation of California Education Code § 60044) only against SBUSD.

"seek to improve outcomes especially for cultural groups whose needs are currently not being met," but they also "anticipate outcomes improving for all groups" as a result. Dkt. No. 1-1 at 10.

Based in Santa Barbara, JCCC provides trainings and services to the tri-county area of Ventura, Santa Barbara, and San Luis Obispo. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 59, 65, 68. JCCC employs facilitators who live and work locally and were educated at local institutions. Dkt. No. 1-2 (JCCC slides) at 152–155. Many JCCC facilitators hold bachelor's and advanced degrees. Id.

JCCC's programs are focused on "closing the educational achievement gap." Dkt. 9 No. 1-1 (2018 Proposed Contract between JCCC and SBUSD) at 1. For example, JCCC's 10 "Institute for Equity in Education" ("IEE") program does this by building trusting 11 relationships between participants of different backgrounds, teaching educators to rely on 12 culturally-relevant examples and experiences. Id. at 1, App'x. A; see also Dkt. No. 1-2 13 (JCCC slides) at 1, 7–8, 15, 59, 87–93, 98-100, 156. Other workshops help educate parents 14 on equity concepts, or teach students about institutional racism and educational inequality 15 in the context of the history of the United States educational system. Dkt. No. 1-1 at 16 17 App'x. A, Dkt. No. 1-2 at 98-100.

Plaintiff FESB alleges that it is an organization formed to advocate for fair education 18 policies in the Santa Barbara Unified School District and in Santa Barbara County. Dkt. 19 No. 1 ¶ 11-12. FESB further alleges that it is a coalition of "concerned parents of students 20 in the Santa Barbara Unified School District," who are residents and tax payers within Santa Barbara County and who are parents of current minor students in the SBUSD system 22 that identify as Caucasian, Christian and/or male. Id.

ARGUMENT III.

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Α. **Legal Standards**

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of the claims stated in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss,

a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to 1 2 relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility 3 when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 4 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. A complaint that 5 offers mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 6 of action will not do." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation marks 7 omitted). "Allegations in the complaint, together with reasonable inferences therefrom, 8 are assumed to be true for purposes of the motion." Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 9 541, 545 (9th Cir. 2007). Dismissal is proper where there is a "lack of a cognizable legal 10 theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." 11 Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Balistreri v. 12 Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). 13

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B. <u>Counts I-III</u>: FESB Lacks Standing To Bring Its Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, And Cal. Gov. Code § 11135 Alleged Discrimination Claims

16 The Supreme Court has recognized that "it is not enough that the party invoking the power of the court have a keen interest in the issue." Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 17 18 693, 700, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659, 186 L. Ed. 2d 768 (2013). Rather, "[o]ne of the essential 19 elements of a legal case or controversy is that the plaintiff have standing to sue." *Trump* v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2416 (2018). The Standing Doctrine ensures that litigants have 20 21 "a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to . . . justify the exercise of the 22 court's remedial powers on their behalf." Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., ---- U.S. 23 —, 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650, 198 L.Ed.2d 64 (2017) (citations and internal alterations 24 omitted). The "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing requires that a plaintiff 25 allege that he has "(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged 26 conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 27 decision." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2016), as

revised (May 24, 2016) (quoting *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)).

1. None of FESB's Alleged Members Have Standing To Bring These Claims

The Supreme Court has explained that "the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact'—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized." *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560. But FESB has not pled any direct injury to its members. Instead, FESB's Complaint asserts two potential "injuries:"² (1) a hostile educational environment created by JCCC's allegedly discriminatory materials, and (2) a financial cost to taxpayers derived from paying for JCCC's trainings. Because neither satisfies the Constitutional minimums for standing, FESB's Title VI, § 1983, and Cal. Gov. Code § 11135 claims must be dismissed. *See* Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 4, 7.

FESB claims to be a "coalition of concerned parents of students in the Santa Barbara Unified School District, all of whom are residents and tax payers within Santa Barbara County." *Id.* at ¶¶ 11–12, 20. There is no question that Federal taxpayer standing is prohibited except in extremely limited circumstances for challenges to congressional spending in violation of the Establishment clause. *DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno*, 547 U.S. 332, 333–34, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1856, 164 L. Ed. 2d 589 (2006) ("Although *Flast* held out the possibility that 'specific [constitutional] limitations' other than the Establishment Clause might support federal taxpayer standing, only the Establishment Clause has been held to do so since[.]" (citations omitted)). Instead, when alleging claims based on "stigmatizing injuries" caused by discrimination, standing is proper for "those persons who are *personally denied equal treatment*" by the challenged discriminatory conduct[.]" *Allen*

² FESB further alleges in its Motion for Preliminary Injunction that as "SBUSD taxpayers," it has standing to bring California state law claim concerning competitive bids. Dkt. No. 8 at 25–27. Without admitting that the facts support such an allegation as to the state law contract bidding claim, JCCC focuses here on the separate issue of Plaintiff's lack of standing to bring the federal and state discrimination claims.

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v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984)³, abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014).

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But FESB has made no such allegation. FESB claims to be comprised of parents of 3 students in SBUSD schools that "identify as Caucasian, Christian and/or male." Dkt. No. 1 4 ¶ 20. FESB, however, does not identify who its members are, whether its members have 5 attended or been subjected to any of JCCC's allegedly discriminatory materials, or whether 6 any of its members have been discriminated against at all. Cf. Allen, 468 U.S. at 755 ("Yet 7 standing was denied in each case because the plaintiffs were not personally subject to the 8 challenged discrimination."); see also Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. 9 Horne, 626 F. App'x 200, 201 (9th Cir. 2015) ("Plaintiffs have not alleged that their 10 members were *personally denied equal treatment* under Allen, as stigmatic injury caused 11 by being a target of official discrimination is not itself a personal denial of equal 12 treatment."); Jones v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., No. WDCV087201JFWPJW, 2010 13 WL 11549365, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2010) (finding no standing where parent's 14 "retaliation claim is based on retaliation directed at her daughter, not her"); Crawford v. 15 Kern Ctv. Ctv. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trustees, No. 1:10CV-0425-OWW-JLT, 2010 WL 16 1980246, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2010), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. 17 Crawford v. Kern Cty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trustees, No. 1:10CV-0425-OWW-JLT, 2010 WL 18 2555637 (E.D. Cal. June 21, 2010) ("Although they allege that 'parents' are prevented 19 from having unfettered access to school meetings and to the classroom, *they do not allege* 20 that they have been so prevented."). 21

And FESB's claims of a "hostile educational environment" are similarly unavailing. 22 FESB claims that JCCC's teachings have led to "[a]nti-white graffiti [that] has appeared within SBUSD schools," "[a]nti-white racial epithets [that] have been hurled at SBUSD 24 teachers and students," and "[a]nti-white slogans [that] have recently defaced the Mission 25 Santa Barbara." Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 27. Even taken as true, FESB never alleges (and appears to 26

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Emphasis added throughout except as otherwise noted.

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have no basis to allege) that any of these alleged actions were directed at FESB or its members, as would be required to demonstrate a "concrete and particularized" injury requisite for standing. *See Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560. Without this "Constitutional minimum," FESB cannot demonstrate it has standing to pursue its claims in federal court. This Court should dismiss its Title VI, Cal. Gov. Code § 11135, and § 1983 claims for this reason alone.⁴

Additionally, in order to show injury under Title VI, the Ninth Circuit requires a 7 showing of not only a (1) "a racially hostile environment," but also (2) that the "district 8 had notice of the problem" and (3) that it "failed to respond adequately to redress the 9 racially hostile environment." Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 10 1033 (1998) (quoting 59 Fed.Reg. at 11449). These same requirements apply to claims 11 made under Cal. Gov. Code § 11135. Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm'n, 636 F.3d 12 511, 519 (9th Cir. 2011) ("Title VI is identical in prohibiting discrimination [to Cal. Gov. 13 Code § 11135], but applies to programs sponsored with federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 14 In light of the parallel language of state and federal law, federal law provides important 15 guidance...."). FESB's Complaint is additionally devoid of any alleged facts suggesting 16 either of the Defendants had the requisite notice (either actual or constructive), or that they 17 failed to adequately redress the allegedly hostile environment after being put on notice. 18 Accordingly, this Court should dismiss FESB's Title VI and Cal. Gov. Code § 11135 19 claims for these additional reasons.

Moreover, in order to demonstrate standing in Federal Courts, FESB must also

demonstrate causation such that its alleged injury is "fairly ... trace[able] to the

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challenged action of the defendant." *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560. Plaintiff can make no such showing, in part, because they refuse to identify their individual members. *Allen*, 468 U.S. at 758–59 (criticizing claims alleging discriminatory outcomes involving third-party "parents of children attending such schools[] who may not even exist in the respondents' communities). While FESB has alleged a "hostile educational environment," it has not shown that these events—including anti-white racial slurs and graffiti, some of which has not even occurred in Santa Barbara schools—have anything to do with JCCC's educational materials taught in SBUSD school since 2005. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 27.

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2. FESB Also Does Not Sufficiently Plead That It Has Organizational Standing To Bring These Claims

FESB has similarly failed to sufficiently plead organizational standing for its § 1983 claim. "An organization may have standing to bring suit on behalf of its members if (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose, and (3) the participation of individual members in the lawsuit is not required." *Jankey v. Beach Hut*, No. CV 05-3856 SVW JTLX, 2005 WL 5517235, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2005) (quoting *Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n*, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).

As discussed above, FESB cannot demonstrate that any of its members have standing to sue in their own right. *Supra* Section B.1; *see also Black Faculty Ass'n of Mesa Coll. v. San Diego Cmty. Coll. Dist.*, 664 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Because neither [Plaintiffs] suffered or were threatened by any injury which could have given them standing in their own right, BFA cannot have associational standing to sue on their behalf."). Accordingly, FESB fails at least the first requirement necessary to demonstrate it would have organizational standing for the Title VI, § 1983, or Cal. Gov. Code § 11135 claims, and those claims should be dismissed.

C. <u>Count IV</u>: FESB Does Not Sufficiently Plead A Discrimination Claim Under California Education Code § 220

California Education Code § 220 prohibits "discrimination on the basis of disability, gender, gender identity, gender expression, nationality, race or ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation" by educational institutions that receive or benefit from state financial assistance. Cal. Educ. Code § 220. Claims made pursuant to this section are governed by the same elements as a federal cause of action under Title IX. *See Donovan v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist.*, 167 Cal.App.4th 567, 603, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 285 (2008). To sufficiently plead such a claim, a plaintiff must allege: "(1) he or she suffered *severe, pervasive and offensive harassment*, that *effectively deprived* plaintiff of the right of equal access to educational benefits and opportunities; (2) the school district had actual knowledge of that

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harassment; and (3) the school district acted with *deliberate indifference* in the face of such knowledge." Donovan, 167 Cal.App.4th at 579 (internal quotations omitted); Davis 2 Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 652 (1999) ("[T]he 3 behavior be serious enough to have the systemic effect of denying the victim equal access 4 to an educational program or activity."). Because FESB has neither pled that its students suffered such "severe, pervasive and offensive harassment" nor that SBUSD acted with 6 "deliberate indifference" to that harassment, its claims fail as a matter of law and should be dismissed. 8

FESB's sole allegation supporting this alleged discrimination is that "SBUSD and 9 JCCC intentionally discriminated against certain of Plaintiff's members and/or their minor 10 children students on the basis of their race, ethnicity, religion and/or gender by 11 intentionally supporting, promoting and implementing JCCC's programming in SBUSD's 12 schools with knowledge of its discriminatory content and application, which has created a 13 hostile educational environment for teachers and students who are Caucasian, Christian 14 and/or Male." Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 54. Elsewhere, FESB claims that "[t]he negative effects of 15 JCCC's programming are . . . creating a hostile educational environment for teachers and 16 students that fall within a so-called 'Privileged Group,'" which, it alleges, is evidenced by 17 "[a]nti-white graffiti [that] has appeared within SBUSD schools," "[a]nti-white racial 18 epithets have been hurled at SBUSD teachers and students," and "[a]nti-white slogans 19 [that] have recently defaced the Mission Santa Barbara." Id. ¶ 27. These allegations are 20 insufficient. 21

First, FESB's vague and conclusory allegations of a "hostile educational 22 environment" or "intentional discrimination" do not rise to the requisite standard for § 220. 23 A complaint that offers mere "labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the 24 elements of a cause of action will not do." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 25 U.S. at 555). Rather, FESB must plead specific facts that demonstrate the "severe, 26 pervasive and offensive harassment" or "deliberate indifference" necessary to make a claim 27

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under California Education Code § 220, including that the school ignored complaints about such harassment or that the measures they took to address such complaints were inadequate. *See Donovan*, 167 Cal.App.4th at 317-18 ("[D]eliberate indifference is a 'very high standard'" and "ensures that the disciplinary actions of school officials will not be second-guessed by the courts.").

Second, none of the remaining atmospheric facts alleged by FESB constitute a 6 "hostile educational environment" demonstrating that FESB or any minor-children of its 7 members have suffered "severe, pervasive and offensive harassment, that effectively 8 deprived plaintiff of the right of equal access to educational benefits and opportunities," as 9 is required for this claim. Donovan, 167 Cal.App.4th at 579. Undoubtedly, racial 10 harassment can create a hostile environment if it is "sufficiently severe that it would 11 interfere with the educational program of a reasonable person of the same age and race as 12 the victim." See Monteiro, 158 F.3d at 1033 (allowing Title VI claim to proceed where 13 Plaintiff alleged her ninth-grade daughter (and others) were routinely called "niggers," the 14 term was graffitied on the civics and social-studies buildings, and the school ignored 15 numerous complaints). 16

But here, FESB's statement that "Anti-white graffiti has appeared within SBUSD 17 schools" or that "Anti-white racial epithets" have been used does not provide enough facts 18 necessary to demonstrate the harassment is "sufficiently severe" to deprive a reasonable 19 person of their education, nor does it demonstrate SBUSD administrators knowingly 20 allowed such harassment to continue. FESB does not allege: what this "anti-white graffiti" 21 is, how often it has "appeared," which school(s) or building(s) were graffitied, whether 22 students saw the graffiti, or any facts that would allow the Court to draw inferences as to 23 these events. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 27. FESB's allegations of "anti-white racial epithets" lack those 24 same details. *Id.* FESB does not even allege the ages of any potentially-affected minor 25 children, which was a key factor considered by the Ninth Circuit when accepting a similar 26 claim under Title VI. Monteiro, 158 F.3d at 1033-34 ("This is especially so when we also 27

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consider . . . the victim's age."); see also Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. 1 2 Supp. 2d 1107, 1115 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (dismissing Plaintiff's Title IX complaint for failure to "allege any facts surrounding the circumstances in which the harassing comments were 3 allegedly made," leaving court unable to determine whether harassment "was sufficiently 4 hostile and severe"); Davis, 526 U.S. at 651 (emphasizing harassment must be severe and 5 persistent because "schools are unlike the adult workplace" and "at least early on, students 6 are still learning how to interact appropriately with their peers."). FESB's conclusory 7 statements are insufficient to demonstrate the "severe, pervasive and offensive harassment" 8 required here. 9

Further, FESB has not pled sufficient facts to enable an inference that the anti-white slogans at the "recently" defaced Mission Santa Barbara are a result of (or even related to) the allegedly-discriminatory course materials taught in SBUSD schools since 2005. Indeed, FESB has provided almost no factual details of this event, merely claiming that the defacement included "anti-white slogans." Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 27; *see Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors*, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.").

At bottom, FESB has not fulfilled the pleading requirements necessary to make a claim under California Education Code § 220, and this claim should be dismissed.

D. <u>Count VI</u>: This Court Has No Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff's Cal. Contract Code Section 20111 Claim

FESB cannot—and does not even try to—demonstrate that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over its claim pursuant to California Public Contract Code § 20111. Dkt. No. 8 (Plaintiff's Notice of Motion) at 1. FESB alleges that the district court has jurisdiction over its case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Dkt. No. 1 (Complaint) ¶ 9. But those statutes describe *federal question* subject matter jurisdiction; neither provides jurisdiction for this court to adjudicate a *state-law claim. See* 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties *of the United States*"); 28 U.S.C. § 1343 Just Communities Central Coast, Inc.'s Case No. 2:18-cv-10253-SVW-PLA Motion To Dismiss

(providing jurisdiction over *federal* civil rights claims). As such, this Court should dismiss FESB's Claim under California Public Contract Code § 20111 for this failure to plead jurisdiction alone. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.").

Moreover, this Court does not have the authority to assert supplemental jurisdiction over this claim. District courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction only over "all other 6 claims that are so related to [federal] claims in the action . . . that they form part of the same 7 case or controversy" under Article III of the Constitution.⁵ 28 U.S.C. § 1367. A state law 8 claim "is part of the same case or controversy when it shares a 'common nucleus of 9 operative fact' with the federal claims and the state and federal claims would normally be 10 tried together." White v. Deloitte & Touche, 553 F. App'x 754, 755 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 12 Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004)).

Here, FESB's federal law claims—see Dkt. No. 1 (Complaint) at Counts I and II— 13 are based on the allegedly discriminatory *content* of JCCC's educational programming.⁶ 14 By contrast, Count VI challenges the bidding and contracting process conducted by 15 SBUSD. The elements of a claim alleging a violation of California Public Contract Code 16 § 20111 include: 1) contract with school district; 2) contract for more than \$50,000; and 3) 17 whether the contract was required to be put out to bid. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 64–72. None of 18 those elements share a "common nucleus of operative fact" with the alleged discriminatory 19 content of JCCC's programs that form the basis of Plaintiff's Counts I and II. At best, the 20 contract may be "logically related" or "provide[] background" to the federal claims, but 21 that is not enough to establish supplemental jurisdiction. See Tranik Enters. Inc. v. 22

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Subject matter jurisdiction also exists when the citizenship of the parties is sufficiently diverse, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 1332, but because all relevant parties in this case are California residents, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction. *See* Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 12. 5

²⁶ JCCC does not argue here that FESB's state law discrimination claims—Count III, for alleged violation of California Government Code § 11135, and Count IV, for violation of California Education Code Section § 220—fail this common nucleus of operative 6 27 fact test. 28

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AuthenticWatches.com, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-02931-SVW-JC, 2016 WL 11002491 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2016) (quoting Burgess v. Omar, 345 F. Supp. 2d 369, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)) ("the Court finds that the counterclaims do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the Plaintiff's original claims, the Defendants are free to bring their claims against the Plaintiff in a separate action in state court."). Even if the Court finds that there is a common nucleus of operative facts, because FESB does not have standing on the federal discrimination claims, the court may not retain supplemental jurisdiction on the state law claims. See Scott v. Pasadena Unified School Dist. 306 F.3d 646, 664 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir.2001) ("If the district court dismisses all federal claims on the merits, it has discretion under § 1367(c) to adjudicate the remaining claims; if the court dismisses for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it has no discretion and must dismiss all claims.")). Supplemental jurisdiction is unavailable, and without it, no subject matter jurisdiction exists for this court to entertain Count IV of FESB's Complaint.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, JCCC respectfully request that this Court dismiss FESB's claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d *et seq.*; the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, via 41 U.S.C. § 1983; Cal. Gov. Code § 11135 for failing to plead sufficient facts demonstrating standing; Cal. Educ. Code § 220 for failure to state a claim under that sections heightened pleading standard; and Cal. Pub. Con. Code § 20111 for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.

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